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THE CASE FOR REVISITING CONTINGENT
LIABILITIES UNDER ARTICLE VIII
Joshua Hansen-King
Abstract: Prior to 2012, Washington municipalities frequently relied on contingentliability  agreements  (“CLA”  or   “CLAs”)  to   reduce  borrowing  costs  because  such  liabilities  
did not constitute debt under article VIII of the Washington State Constitution. But the
viability  of  CLAs   was  called  into  question  by  the  Washington  State  Supreme  Court’s  2012  
plurality decision in In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center
Public Facilities District (“Wenatchee Events Center”), which applied a new method for
determining what constitutes debt—the risk-of-loss principle—to conclude that the entire
value of a CLA constitutes debt. This Essay urges the Court to revisit the opinion because the
decision fails to offer clear guidance and relies on an unpersuasive distinction between debt
and indebtedness to explain the holding. Additionally, this Essay argues that the risk-of-loss
principle is not the correct standard for municipal debt because the framework is not
supported by Washington precedent and the principle is a novel approach that disregards the
origins  of  Washington’s  debt  provisions.   If  the  Court  decides  to  continue  treating  CLAs  as  
debt, this Essay suggests the Court should not follow Wenatchee Event Center’s  conclusion  
that the entire value of the CLA is debt and instead adopt the approach of the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles for governments: The amount of debt equals only that
portion that is likely to become owed.

INTRODUCTION
Before 2012, Washington municipalities commonly used contingentliability   agreements   (“CLA”   or   “CLAs”)1 to help other municipalities
reduce borrowing costs by making it easier to secure affordable bond
rates.2 Under these agreements, a municipality typically agreed to pay
the   borrower’s   debt   or   provide   a   loan   only   if   the borrower—often
another municipality—was unable to pay bondholders.3 After executing
1. Contingent  liabilities  are  “liabilities  or  obligations  which  become  the  financial  responsibility  of  
another   at   a   given   date   when   certain   conditions   are   not   met.”   ROY J. KOEGEN, WASHINGTON
MUNICIPAL FINANCING DESKBOOK 522 (1993). CLAs are one method of creating contingent
liabilities.
2. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Treasurer in Support of Direct Review at 2, 10–
11, In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee  Reg’l  Events  Center  Pub.  Facilities  Dist.,  175  Wash.  
2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (No. 86552-3) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of
Direct Review]. The amount secured by CLAs is significant; these agreements back more than $271
million in bonds. Id. at 10 (calculating the value of CLAs secured by public facilities district but not
including other municipal corporations).
3. Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Treasurer at 1–2, In re Bond Issuance of Greater
Wenatchee  Reg’l  Events  Center  Pub.  Facilities  Dist.,  175  Wash.  2d  788,  287  P.3d  567  (2012)  (No.  
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a  CLA,  the  borrower’s  debt  secured  by  the  agreement  was  not  counted  
towards the non-borrowing   municipality’s   constitutional   debt   limit  
because their obligation to pay or lend money was contingent on the
borrower not paying.4 This practice was approved by Comfort v. City of
Tacoma,5 a 1927 Washington State Supreme Court decision that
established the contingent-liability doctrine.6 This doctrine, however,
was called into question  by  the  Court’s  2012  plurality  decision  in   In re
Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public
Facilities District (“Wenatchee Events Center”).7
In Wenatchee Events Center, the Court evaluated a proposed CLA
between the City of Wenatchee  (the  “City”)  and  the  Greater  Wenatchee  
Regional  Event  Center  Public  Facilities  District  (the  “District”).8 Under
the proposed agreement, the City would be obligated to make a loan to
the District if the District lacked sufficient funds to meet its bondpayment obligations.9 The lead opinion concluded that the potential
obligation under the proposed agreement was debt under the Washington
State Constitution article VIII.10 The plurality reached this conclusion
by: (1) distinguishing   between   “debt”   and   “indebtedness”—the key
terms used to restrict state and municipal debt respectively11—and
(2) deducing the existence of the risk-of-loss principle.12 After
recognizing the principle, the Court applied it to determine whether a
contingent liability is a debt of a municipality.13 In doing so, the lead
86552-3) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae].
4. Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255–56, 252 P. 929, 931 (1927).
5. Id. at 255, 252 P. at 931.
6. See In re Bond  Issuance  of  Greater  Wenatchee  Reg’l Events Center Pub. Facilities Dist., 175
Wash. 2d 788, 800, 287 P.3d 567, 573 (2012) [hereinafter Wenatchee Events Center] (plurality
opinion) (discussing Comfort’s  “contingency  doctrine”).
7. 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (plurality opinion). While five justices signed the
opinion, one of the signatories concurred in the result only. Id. at 810, 287 P.3d at 578 (noting that
Justice   Wiggins’s   lead   opinion   was   signed   by   Justices   C.   Johnson, J. Johnson, González, and
Stephens, but that Justice Stephens concurred only in the result). Washington State courts treat such
a decision as a plurality. See, e.g., Kailin v. Clallam Cnty. 152 Wash. App 974, 985, 220 P.3d 222,
226–27 (2009) (stating there was no majority opinion when four justices signed onto the reasoning
and a fifth concurred in the result only).
8. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791, 287 P.3d at 569.
9. Id. at 793, 287 P.3d at 570.
10. Id. at 791–92, 287 P.3d at 569.
11. Id. at 806–07, 287 P.3d at 577.
12. See id. at 798 n.9, 287 P.3d at 572 n.9. The principle means there is debt when taxpayers
could be responsible for a payment, id. at 798–99, 287 P.3d at 573, and is discussed further infra
Part I.C.2.a.
13. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574.
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opinion rejected Comfort’s  contingent-liability doctrine14 but also noted
that the opinion was not overruling Comfort—instead, the plurality
distinguished the contingent liability in Wenatchee Events Center from
the similar agreement in Comfort.15 Specifically, Wenatchee Events
Center focused   on   how   the   City’s   CLA   secured   the   District’s   entire  
repayment obligation while Comfort’s   contingent   agreement   secured  
only  a  portion  of  the  primary  debtor’s  obligation.16 For the lead opinion,
this meant Wenatchee Events Center presented debt because the
agreement was properly construed as a guaranty while Comfort did not
create debt because the underlying agreement could properly be called a
contingent obligation.17
The decision in Wenatchee Events Center creates two significant
problems. First, the lead opinion fails to offer clear guidance on CLAs to
lower courts or municipalities because: (1) as a plurality opinion, the
decision has limited precedential value;18 and (2) the opinion appeared to
both approve and reject the contingent-liability doctrine.19 This
uncertainty about the treatment of CLAs will disrupt municipal
borrowing by increasing borrowing costs, impeding cooperation between
municipalities, and making it difficult to ascertain the value added by
these agreements.20 Second,   the   opinion’s   treatment   of   contingent  
liabilities could disrupt municipal planning or existing projects by
forcing municipalities to suddenly recognize new debt from pre-existing
CLAs, which could push municipalities beyond their constitutional
limits and prevent them from incurring new debt.21
In response to these practical concerns about the effects of Wenatchee
Events Center and   issues   with   the   opinion’s   analysis   (discussed   infra),
14. Id. at 800–01, 287 P.3d at 574.
15. Id. at  802,  287  P.3d  at  574  (noting  that  “Comfort may well have been correctly decided on its
facts”  and  explaining  how  Comfort is distinguishable from Wenatchee Events Center).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. In re Isadore,   151   Wash.   2d   294,   302,   88   P.3d   390,   394   (2004)   (noting   that   “[a] plurality
opinion  has  limited  precedential  value  and  is  not  binding  on  the  courts”).
19. Infra Part I.C.2.b.
20. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 7.
21. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Direct Review, supra note 2, at 10–11. While the lead
opinion did not opine on whether its holding would have applied to preexisting CLAs because
Wenatchee Events Center only concerned a proposed agreement, municipalities have nonetheless
treated the opinion as having retroactive effect by recognizing preexisting CLAs as debt. See, e.g.,
KING CNTY., WASH., OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 27 (Nov. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.emma.msrb.org/EA485733-EA376808-EA773580.pdf; HOUS. AUTH. OF SNOHOMISH
CNTY., OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 20 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP724576EP562183-EP963365.pdf.
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this Essay: (1) asserts that the Court should revisit, correct, and clarify
the treatment of contingent liabilities; and (2) proposes an alternative
standard for when these liabilities should be recognized as debt. Part I
explains  the  applicable  parts  of  Washington’s  constitutional  debt  limits  
and the lead opinion in Wenatchee Events Center. Part II argues that
Wenatchee Events Center’s analysis and conclusion are problematic, and
proposes a different standard based on the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITS BEFORE AND AFTER
WENATCHEE EVENTS CENTER

An examination of Wenatchee Events Center requires an
understanding of Washington’s constitutional debt limits. Accordingly,
this Essay begins with an examination of the Washington State
Constitution article VIII, sections 1 and 6—specifically, those sections’
origins, text, and interpretation—before concluding with a summary of
Wenatchee Events Center’s lead opinion.
A.

Constitutional Restrictions on Debt in Washington

Before  turning  to  Washington’s  debt  limits,  this   Essay highlights the
impetus for these limits and the background against which they were
enacted.
1.

National Trends Influenced Washington’s  Debt  Limits

Washington’s   constitution,   drafted   in   1889,   came   at   the   end   of   a  
century that saw two waves of constitutional reform aimed at limiting
public debt.22 The first wave targeted state debt as a response to the
Financial Panic of 1837 when states that had borrowed aggressively
were unable to meet their obligations.23 These changes left municipal
debt unchecked.24 The second wave, starting in the 1870s, targeted
municipal debt as a response to rapid, unchecked increases in spending
that left many municipalities near bankruptcy with little to show for their
efforts.25
22. Reuven Mark Bisk, Note, State and Municipal Lease—Purchase Agreements: A
Reassessment, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 525–26 (1984).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 525.
25. See C. Dickerman Williams & Peter R. Nehemkis, Jr., Municipal Improvement as Affected by
Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 177, 177–78, 180 (1937).
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While the first wave favored absolute limits on state debt, the second
wave eschewed specific amounts in favor of linking municipal-debt
limits to a floating value.26 These municipal provisions generally use
similar language and structure: restricting debt to a set percentage of the
assessed value of taxable property in the municipality.27 These
constitutional sections were designed to prevent municipalities from
indulging in extravagant or improvident purchases that they could not
afford by shifting the cost to future generations.28
Towards the end of the debt-limit   movement’s   second   wave,  
Washington held its constitutional convention.29 The delegates were
aware of the recent additions of debt-limit provisions to various state
constitutions30 and were guided by similar concerns: the dangers of
unlimited debt and detrimental effect of unrestrained indebtedness on
future prosperity.31 Specifically, the delegates wanted limits that would
protect people from the type of bad decisions that led to government
bankruptcies in the 1800s,32 guard taxpayer credit,33 and prevent the
oppression that develops from potentially ruinous taxation.34 In pursuit
of these goals, the delegates chose constitutional debt limitations
because those at the convention believed: (1) political checks were

26. See Bisk, supra note 22, at 525.
27. C. Robert Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly
Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234, 241 (1958) (noting that nearly every state
constitution limits municipal debt to a percentage of the value of taxable property); infra note 40
(comparing debt-limit language between states).
28. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 25, at 180. Although the restrictions were designed as rigid
barriers,  the  limits  have  been  construed  more  liberally  to  avoid  crippling  municipalities’  ability  to  
function effectively. Dennis J. Heil, Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt: Debt Limitation, the
Broad Special Fund Doctrine, and WPPSS 4 and 5, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 81, 86 (1983)
(noting there has been a nation-wide trend of courts approving devices for evading local-debt limits
in response to rigid debt-limit provisions).
29. See HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 54
(1916) (listing the 27 states that adopted limits between 1867 and 1907); THE JOURNAL OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889 WITH ANALYTICAL INDEX 1 (Beverly
Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999) [hereinafter JOURNAL] (indicating the convention began on July 4,
1889); Bisk, supra note 22, at 525 (noting that municipal-debt   limits   “quickly   followed”   the  
Depression of 1873).
30. See JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 44–45 (reprinting a letter presented to the delegates that
highlighted  other  states’  constitutional  provisions  restricting  debt).
31. Id. at 667; see also Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246,  257,  804  P.2d  
1241, 1246 (1991) (plurality opinion).
32. Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 257–58, 804 P.2d at 1246.
33. Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 801, 666 P.2d 329, 344
(1983) (Dore, J., concurring).
34. Id. (quoting 56 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations § 599, at 651 (1971)).
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insufficient35 and (2) a constitution without such limits would render
municipal bonds worthless36—a belief likely driven by the history of
municipal bankruptcies, caused by unchecked spending, that impaired
bond repayment.37
With goals that were similar to the other states that had already
enacted limits, the convention delegates discussed proposals that
mirrored versions passed in other states.38 Ultimately, the delegates
enacted stringent constitutional restrictions on the ability of the state and
municipalities to incur debt39 in line with provisions enacted earlier in
other states.40 Like other jurisdictions, the delegates created provisions
imposing   an   “impassable   barrier”41 designed   “for   the   protection   of  
minorities, for the protection of posterity, and to protect majorities
against  their  own  improvidence.”42

35. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 796, 287 P.3d 567, 571 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
36. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 160 (2d ed.
2013).
37. See Bisk, supra note 22, at 525 (explaining that constitutional debt limits developed in
response to local government bankruptcies caused by fiscal imprudence).
38. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE § 4.2, 171 (1992) (discussing how states often enacted absolute limits on
state debt while linking municipal-debt limits to a percentage of assessed property value); JOURNAL,
supra note 29, at 668–71, 675–79 (documenting that the delegates considered absolute limits on
state debt and dynamic limits on municipal debt linked to a percentage of property values).
39. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1972); WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (amended 1952).
40. See State ex rel. Troy   v.   Yelle,   36   Wash.   2d   192,   204,   217   P.2d   337,   343   (1950)   (“Many  
states  have  constitutional  provisions  generally  similar  to  [article  VIII]  of  our  constitution.”);;  Arthur  
S. Beardsley, Sources of the Washington Constitution, in 2011–2012 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 385,
411 (noting   that   section   6   is   similar   to   a   provision   in   Illinois’   Constitution).   Compare WASH.
CONST. art. VIII, § 6  (stating  that  no  municipality  “shall  for  any  purpose   become  indebted in any
manner  to  an  amount  exceeding”  a  certain  percentage),  with IND. CONST. art. 13, § 1 (stating that no
municipality  “shall  ever  become  indebted,  in  any  manner  or  for  any  purpose  to  an  amount,  in  the  
aggregate,   exceeding”   a   certain   percentage), and WIS. CONST. art XI, § 3(2) (stating that no
municipality   “may   become   indebted   in   an   amount   that   exceeds”   a   certain   percentage).   The  
similarities are not surprising because the delegates were aware of the practices in other states.
JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 44–45.
41. State ex rel. Jones v. McGraw, 12 Wash. 541, 543, 41 P. 893, 894 (1895). It is questionable,
however, how strict and impassable the barrier is when the Court has determined multiple funding
mechanisms are not debt and permitted municipalities to exceed their debt limit for public
emergencies. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 796–97, 287 P.3d 567, 571–72
(2012) (plurality opinion) (noting the various principles and interpretations the Court has used to
exclude obligations from implicating the debt limits); cf. Heil, supra note 28, at 86 (recognizing a
national trend of courts approving methods for evading rigid limits).
42. State ex rel. Potter v. King Cnty., 45 Wash. 519, 528, 88 P. 935, 938 (1907).
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Washington’s  Constitutional  Limits  on  State  and  Municipal  Debt

Motivated by concerns expressed throughout the two debt movements
of   the   1800s,   the   delegates   at   Washington’s   Constitutional   Convention  
settled on two separate limits: one for municipalities and another for the
state.
Article VIII, section 6 permits municipalities to become indebted for
a public purpose but limits the amount of debt they can incur.43 Under
section 6:
No county, city, town, school district, or other municipal
corporation shall for any purpose become indebted in any
manner to an amount exceeding one and one-half per centum of
the taxable property in such county, city, town, school district,
or other municipal corporation without the assent of three-fifths
of the voters . . . .44
This provision has remained substantively unchanged since the
Constitution was ratified.45
Relatedly, article VIII, section 1 limits state debt. The original
provision restricted the state to $400,000 of debt.46 In 1972, section 1
was amended to make the limit a floating number based upon a
percentage of general revenues over a specific number of years.47
Despite the significant change, the Court has concluded that the
underlying purpose of section 1 remains the same.48 The state debt
limitation was further amended in 1999 and in 2012; however, the
function and structure remain generally the same as the 1972 version.49
43. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
44. Id. (emphasis added). Municipalities may also seek voter approval to incur debt up to five
percent of the assessed value of property and can become indebted up to an additional five percent
without voter approval for certain municipal-controlled utilities. Id.
45. See
Washington
State
Constitution,
WASHINGTON
STATE
LEGISLATURE,
http://www.leg.wa.gov/lawsandagencyrules/Pages/constitution.aspx (last visited April 11, 2015)
(indicating there has only been one amendment to article VIII, section 6). The only changes to
section 6 occurred on November 4, 1952, when voters approved slight grammatical changes and the
addition of a clause noting that school districts, with voter assent, can become indebted above the
debt limit. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (repealed 1952), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 6. See also EARL COE, SEC’Y OF STATE, A PAMPHLET 20 (1952) (voter pamphlet for the general
election to be held on Tuesday, November 4, 1952).
46. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1972).
47. A. LUDLOW KRAMER, SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET 50–51 (1972) (voter
pamphlet for the general election to be held on Tuesday, November 7, 1972).
48. Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246,  257,  804  P.2d  1241,  1246  (1991)  
(plurality opinion).
49. The 1999 amendment allowed the state to guaranty voter-approved, general-obligation debt of
the school district without having the guaranty count as state debt. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF
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The current version provides:
The aggregate debt contracted by the state, as calculated by the
treasurer at the time debt is contracted, shall not exceed that
amount for which payments of principal and interest in any
fiscal year would require the state to expend more than the
applicable percentage limit of the arithmetic mean of its general
state revenues for the six immediately preceding fiscal
years . . . .50
There are three main differences between the state and municipal debt
limitations. First, the provisions calculate the limit differently. The state
limit is a percentage of general revenues over multiple years while the
municipal limit is a percentage of the recently assessed value of taxable
property.51 Second, each section has a different method for determining
whether the limit has been reached. The amount of debt the state can
incur is based on how much debt service must be paid annually
(regardless  of  the  state’s  total  obligations);;  in  contrast,  the  municipality  
restriction focuses on the total amount of debt (without regard to annual
payment obligations).52 Third, the state-debt provision precisely defines
“debt,”  while  the  municipal  provision  does  not.53
B.

Triggering Article VIII Limits

Because Wenatchee Events Center purported to change the article
VIII analysis, a critical examination of the opinion requires an
understanding of how the Court previously interpreted the debt limits—
in particular, what triggered the limits and how contingent liabilities and
guaranties54 were treated.

WASHINGTON VOTERS PAMPHLET 8–9 (1999) (voter pamphlet for the general election to be held on
Tuesday, November 2, 1999). The 2012 amendment changed the formula for calculating how much
debt the state may incur. KING CNTY., OFFICIAL LOCAL VOTERS’ PAMPHLET 32–33 (2012) (voter
pamphlet for the general and special election to be held on Tuesday, November 6, 2012).
50. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b).
51. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
52. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
53. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), with WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
54. The  words  “guarantee”  and  “guaranty”  are  interchangeable.   See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
773  (9th  ed.  2009);;  For  clarity,  this  Essay  uses  “guaranty”  (and  the  plural  “guaranties”)  throughout
because it is favored in Wenatchee Events Center, see generally Wenatchee Events Center, 175
Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (plurality opinion), and is the version more commonly used in
financial contexts, BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 399 (3d ed.
2011).
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Before Wenatchee Events Center, Section 1 and Section 6 Were
Triggered by the Same Types of Obligations

Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court did not recognize a
difference between the types of obligations that would trigger the limits
established in section 1 and section 6.55 Both sections were interpreted
synonymously56 despite different operative phrases—section 1 uses
“[t]he aggregate debt contracted   by   the   state”   and   section   6   employs  
“indebted in   any   manner.”57 The   Court   indicated   that   “debt”   and  
“indebtedness”   were   interchangeable by (1) using municipal cases to
define  “debt”;;58 (2) applying the same principles to both sections59 while
interchangeably citing cases relating to each section;60 and (3) relying on
municipal debt cases to explain how the state-debt limit is calculated.61
Based on this shared understanding of the two provisions, the Court used
the  term  “debt”  to  refer  to  an  obligation  that  implicates  the  article  VIII  
limit of a state or a municipality.
The Court also defined what constituted debt: borrowed money that
the state or municipality was required to pay with proceeds of general
tax levies.62 In State ex rel. Washington State Finance Committee v.
55. While the lead opinion in Wenatchee Events Center does not treat these two provisions
identically, this Essay argues in Part II.B, infra, that treating the provisions differently is an error.
56. See State ex rel. Winston  v.  Rogers,  21  Wash.  206,  208,  57  P.  801,  802  (1899)  (“Section  6  of  
the same article (8) of the constitution limits municipal indebtedness, and should receive the same
construction  as  section  1  relative  to  state  indebtedness.”);;  UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 161
(explaining  section  6’s  limitation  by  stating  “[a]s  with  state  obligations,  debt  is  defined  as  borrowed  
money  payable  from  taxes”).  
57. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(b), 6 (emphasis added).
58. E.g., State ex rel. Wittler v. Yelle, 65 Wash. 2d 660, 669, 399 P.2d 319, 324–25 (1965)
(explaining the meaning of state debt by citing two municipal cases: Winston v. City of Spokane, 12
Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895), and Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 252 P. 929 (1927)).
59. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 661, 384 P.2d
833, 841–42 (1963) (recognizing the applicability of the special-fund doctrine in the state-debt
context); City of Spokane, 12 Wash. at 526, 41 P. at 889 (applying the special-fund doctrine in the
municipal-debt context).
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. McGraw, 13 Wash. 311, 318–19, 43 P. 176, 178
(1895) (applying the special-fund doctrine to state debt and citing City of Spokane—a municipaldebt case). While the Court sometimes declines to apply a case from another section, the Court has
justified those decisions by distinguishing between the financial agreements rather than the sections
addressed in the cases. See, e.g., Martin, 62 Wash. 2d at 659–60, 384 P.2d at 841–42 (addressing
section 1 and distinguishing Comfort and City of Spokane without relying on the fact that those
cases addressed section 6).
61. Rogers, 21 Wash. at 208–09, 57 P. at 802.
62. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 154, 161. For example, the government incurs debt when
bonds are issued that will be repaid from a tax on cigarettes because the government is
(1) borrowing funds from the bond purchasers and (2) repaying those bonds from a generally
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Martin63 the Court wrote that “a   debt   of   the   State   of   Washington”   is
“[a]ny   obligation   which   must   in   law   be   paid   from   any   taxes levied
generally.”64 This opinion was supplemented two years later in State ex
rel. Wittler v. Yelle65 when  the  Court  stated  that  it  “has  many  times  said  
what   Article   8   means   by   the   word   ‘debt.’ . . . [I]t means borrowed
money.”66 While section 1 was later amended to reflect this
understanding,67 the definition continues to resonate for section 6 as
well; Justice Utter—the late Washington State Supreme Court
Justice68—and Professor Hugh Spitzer—a Washington State
Constitution scholar and public-finance lawyer69—embrace this
definition in their treatise on the Washington State Constitution.70
2.

Before Wenatchee Events Center, Guaranties Constituted Debt
While Contingent Obligations Were Not Treated as Debt

With this definition of debt providing a framework for article VIII
analysis, the Court addressed guaranties and CLAs. A guaranty is a
promise to answer for the debt of another if the debtor fails to make a
payment.71 Such an agreement is a narrower form of a CLA, which is the
promise  to  answer  for  another’s  obligation upon the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of a specific event.72 Although guaranties and CLAs are
closely related, the Court developed conflicting case law about these
types of agreements under article VIII. The Court concluded in State
Capitol Commission v. State Board of Finance73 that a guaranty created
debt even though the State was not primarily liable.74 Conversely, the
applicable tax—an excise tax on cigarette sales. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d at 662, 384 P.2d at 843–44.
63. 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963).
64. Id. at 661, 384 P.2d at 843.
65. 65 Wash. 2d 660, 399 P.2d 319 (1965).
66. Id. at 668, 399 P.2d at 324. Wittler also reviewed previous cases and found that borrowed
money was involved in every case where article VIII applied. Id. at 669–70, 399 P.2d at 324–25.
67. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)  (defining  debt  as  “borrowed  money”),  with WASH.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1972) (omitting definition).
68. Justice Robert Utter Profile, GALLAGHER L. LIBR., https://lib.law.washington.edu/content/
memorial/justiceutter (last visited April 10, 2015).
69. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Curriculum Vitae, http://www.law.washington.edu/directory/
CV/SpitzerHugh.pdf (last visited April 11, 2015).
70. See UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 161.
71. Wilson  Court  Ltd.  P’ship  v.  Tony  Maroni’s  Inc.,  134  Wash.  2d  692,  707,  952  P.2d  590,  598  
(1998).
72. See KOEGEN, supra note 1, at 522.
73. 74 Wash. 15, 132 P. 861 (1913).
74. Id. at 26–27, 132 P. at 865.
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Court held in Comfort and Kelly v. City of Sunnyside75 that a contingent
obligation to pay was not debt because the government was not
primarily liable and the likelihood of any liability was speculative.76 The
conflict between these lines of cases was the central issue in Wenatchee
Events Center.
In State Capitol Commission, the Court established that a guaranty of
bonds is debt because   the   state’s   general   credit   had   been   pledged   for  
repayment.77 The Court developed this doctrine while evaluating the
state’s   guaranty   of   bonds   that   were   secured   by   the   capitol-building
fund.78 The Court concluded that these bonds, because of the guaranty,
were general obligations of the state and were article VIII debt in accord
with  “the  spirit  and  the  letter”  of  the  Constitution.79 The Court reached
this conclusion even after acknowledging that taxpayers likely would not
be obligated to make any payments because the value of the land
securing the bonds exceeded the amount of the bonds.80 The mere
possibility that the state would have to use general revenues to pay for
these bonds, however unlikely, was sufficient to establish that the
guaranty of the obligation was article VIII debt.81
In Comfort, the Court recognized the contingent-liability doctrine
without discussing the apparent conflict with State Capitol
Commission’s  treatment  of  guaranties.82 The contingent-liability doctrine
provides that no article VIII debt is incurred when the government is not
primarily liable but is obligated to pay if some event occurs that is
outside the control of the party securing the debt.83 Thus, an agreement
pledging   the   government   fisc   to   repayment   of   another’s   debt   is   not  
75. 168 Wash. 95, 11 P.2d 230 (1932).
76. See id. at 97, 11 P.2d at 231; Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255, 252 P. 929,
931 (1927).
77. See   State   Capitol   Comm’n, 74 Wash. at 26–27, 132 P. at 865. Wenatchee Events Center
asserts that this conclusion was reaffirmed in State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62
Wash. 2d 645, 654–55, 384 P.2d 833, 839 (1963), 175 Wash. 2d 788, 801, 287 P.3d 567, 574 (2012)
(plurality opinion), but Martin did not affirm State  Capitol  Comm’n and instead discussed the case
while surveying earlier cases. See Martin, 62 Wash. 2d at 654–56, 384 P.2d at 839–40.
78. State  Capitol  Comm’n, 74 Wash. at 18, 132 P. at 862.
79. Id. at 27, 132 P. at 865.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255, 252 P. 929, 931 (1927). This decision
reflected the approaches taken in other states. See id. at 256–57, 252 P. at 931 (discussing how other
jurisdictions treat contingent liabilities); 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 41.22 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2005) (collecting cases from different jurisdictions for the
assertion that contingent liabilities do not create indebtedness).
83. See Comfort, 142 Wash. at 255, 252 P. at 931.
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article VIII debt when the obligation to make payments is not realized
until the borrowing entity defaults.84
In Comfort, the city of Tacoma had established a fund—replenished
in certain circumstances by a special-tax levy—that would ensure localimprovement bonds were paid.85 If the city paid a bond using the fund,
the City would be subrogated to the rights of the bondholder.86 However,
there were significant limitations on the fund and its use. First, the
fund’s   value   could   not   exceed   five   percent   of   the   outstanding  
improvement bonds secured by the fund.87 Second, the City was
obligated to pay into the fund and purchase bonds only if the regular
assessments were insufficient.88 Third, bondholders had no recourse
against  Tacoma’s  general  revenue—the bondholders could only sue for
repayment from the local-improvement-bond assessment or the fund
created by Tacoma.89
In evaluating whether the agreement constituted debt, the Court
focused on the last two limitations   and   concluded   that   Tacoma’s  
obligation   was   not   article   VIII   debt   because   it   was   “only   a   contingent  
liability  as  far  as  the  city  is  concerned,  and  in  no  sense  a  debt  proper.”90
It was not a debt because the bondholders had no unconditional right to
receive money from Tacoma:91 The city incurred an obligation only if
the regular assessments were insufficient and the bondholders sought
repayment from the guaranty fund created by the city.92 The Court
explained:
If A. is indebted to B., and C. promises that, if A. does not pay
B., then he (C.) will, no one would contend that C. had an
outstanding debt. He has but a contingent liability that may or
may not ripen into a debt. If A. fails to pay, then, in that event,
the contingent liability has ripened, and the debt is absolute as to
C. But until that time arrives C. owes B. nothing. So in the
present case, the city will have nothing to pay if the property
holders meet their obligations and pay their assessments. If they
fail to do so, then the city will pay into the fund to the extent
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 255–56, 252 P. at 931.
Id. at 254, 252 P. at 929–30.
Id.
Id. at 254–55, 252 P. at 930–31.
Id. at 255, 252 P. at 931.
Id. at 254–55, 252 P. at 930–31.
Id. at 255, 252 P. at 931.
See id.
See id.
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outlined in the statute.93
Accordingly, the Court held a contingent liability is not debt because
the obligation has not actually become a liability but merely gives rise to
the potential that a liability may be incurred.94
In 1932, Kelly reaffirmed Comfort but again the Court did not address
the conflict with State Capitol Commission.95 In Kelly, the Court
clarified the contingent-liability doctrine by responding to the
appellant’s   argument   that   Austin v. City of Seattle96 controlled.97 The
Court explained that Austin was distinguishable because the city was
primarily liable in that case rather than contingently liable.98 Like
Comfort, Kelly focused on whether the treasury was directly and
immediately at risk rather than whether there might ultimately be such a
risk.99 The decision in Kelly helped further delineate the doctrine by
emphasizing that contingent liability is the opposite of primary
liability.100 In sum, the Court used Comfort and Kelly to establish that a
contingent liability—an obligation that may be incurred —is not article
VIII debt.101
Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court had two lines of cases
dealing with the calculation of debt in situations where the government
is not primarily liable: Comfort/Kelly and State Capitol Commission. In
the first line—Comfort and Kelly—the Court held such obligations are
not debt because they are merely contingent liabilities. The Court
determined that the agreements were not debt by focusing on the fact
that the municipality may not be required to make a payment. In the
second line—State Capitol Commission—the Court concluded potential
obligations are debt because they are a guaranty. The Court honed in on
the fact that the treasury ultimately would be responsible for payment if
the primary debtor was unable to pay. In sum, the Court had two lines of
cases dealing with potential obligations—a conflict that posed the
93. Id. at 255–56, 252 P. at 931.
94. See id.
95. See Kelly v. City of Sunnyside, 168 Wash. 95, 96–97, 11 P.2d 230, 231 (1932).
96. 2 Wash. 667, 27 P. 557 (1891).
97. Kelly, 168 Wash. at 97, 11 P.2d at 231.
98. Id. In Austin, the Court concluded a debt was created when a city charter provision made the
city primarily liable for all improvement bonds—whereas in Kelly, the city only had contingent
liability. Id.
99. See Comfort, 142 Wash. at 255, 252 P. at 931 (focusing on whether the municipality was
primarily liable instead of whether it might become liable in the future); Kelly, 168 Wash. at 96–97,
11 P.2d at 231 (relying on Comfort).
100. See Kelly, 168 Wash. at 97, 11 P.2d at 231.
101. UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 36, at 161.
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central issue in Wenatchee Events Center.
C.

Wenatchee Events Center Calls into Question the Continued
Viability of the Contingent-Liability Doctrine by Recasting the
Analysis Used to Determine Debt

In Wenatchee Events Center, the lead opinion attempted to resolve the
conflict between State Capitol Commission and Comfort to answer
whether the proposed CLA between the City and the District constituted
article VIII debt for the City.102 The plurality addressed the conflict by
re-characterizing prior cases as establishing the risk-of-loss principle103
and then using that principle to establish State Capitol Commission as
the correct statement of the law.104 But at the same time, the opinion also
appeared to reaffirm Comfort105 and decide that the CLA was debt
because it was a guaranty rather than a contingent obligation like the
agreement in Comfort.106
1.

The Superior Court Treated the CLA as Debt

At the superior court, the issue in Wenatchee Events Center was
whether the proposed CLA107 between the City and the District
constituted article VIII debt.108 The City and the District negotiated the
CLA to help the District secure affordable financing for bonds.109 Those
bonds would pay off the short-term bond anticipation notes that financed
the construction of the Regional Events Center.110 The CLA would have
obligated the City to loan the District money only if the District lacked
102. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 799–801, 287 P.3d 567, 574 (2012)
(plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73.
104. Id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 803–04, 287 P.3d at 575.
107. Although the final agreement was called an interlocal agreement, Wenatchee City Council
Res. No. 2011-52, at exhibit A (July 14, 2011) (enacted) [hereinafter CLA Terms], available at
http://www.wenatcheewa.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=5657, this is just a broad
term for a contract between two or more public entities. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.34.080 (2014). The
resolution approving the agreement, drafts of the agreement, and the Court were more specific—
each identified the type of contract at issue: a contingent-loan agreement—a form of a CLA. CLA
Terms, supra, at 1; WENATCHEE CITY COUNCIL, COUNCIL PACKET (June 30, 2011), available at
http://www.wenatcheewa.gov/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=5547; Wenatchee Events
Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791, 287 P.3d at 569.
108. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791, 287 P.3d at 569.
109. See CLA Terms, supra note 107, at 1–2.
110. See id.
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sufficient funds to pay the principal and interest on the new bonds.111
This  obligation  was  not  limited  to  the  City’s  debt  limit:  The City had an
unconditional obligation to lend the District as much money as was
required to service the bonds.112 But the District did not have to apply
the loans to servicing the bonds; the City could direct that its loan be
used only for operation costs of the Regional Events Center.113
Furthermore, the City could fund these loans however it saw fit; the
loans did not have to be funded by levying taxes or borrowing money.114
The   CLA   also   limited   the   City’s   potential   liability   from   bondholder  
suits as well as insulating the City against the risk that the District would
be unable to repay the loans because it was insolvent. The CLA provided
that  “[a]ll  liabilities  incurred  by  the  District,  including  but  not  limited  to  
the [b]onds, are obligations solely of the District and shall not be
liabilities  or  obligations  of  the  City.”115 Furthermore, bondholders would
have no recourse against the City.116 The CLA included numerous
provisions  to  ensure  the  City  was  repaid.  First,  the  District’s  obligation  
to repay the loans was absolute and unconditional—the District pledged
its full faith, credit, and resources towards repayment.117 Second, if the
District lacked sufficient debt capacity, then any loan constituted an
equity payment for an interest in the Regional Events Center.118 Third,
the City could force the District to call bonds for redemption, levy a tax,
or put a proposition on the ballot to increase taxes.119
On June 30, 2011, the Wenatchee City Council passed a resolution
approving the CLA on the condition that the City obtain a judicial
declaration that the City had authority to enter the agreement without
voter assent.120 The City filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking a
declaratory judgment on whether the CLA would cause the City to
exceed its debt limit—effectively, the City asked whether the CLA
constituted article VIII debt and, if so, to what extent.121 The Superior
111. Id.
112. See id. at 2–3.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6–7.
120. Id. (resolution attached to terms).
121. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 794, 287 P.3d 567, 570 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
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Court concluded that the entire amount secured by the CLA would
constitute debt under article VIII.122 Following an appeal, the Court took
the case on direct review.123
2.

The Court Concluded the CLA Was Debt After Adopting a New
Framework that Rejected the Contingent-Liability Doctrine

The   lead   opinion   affirmed   the   trial   court’s   decision124 after recharacterizing prior cases to establish that the risk-of-loss principle
guides the analysis under article VIII and makes contingent liabilities
debt under section 6.125 But after concluding that contingent liabilities
are debt, the lead opinion stated that the obligation at the center of the
case was debt based on the fact that the agreement was actually a
guaranty.126
a.

The Lead Opinion Re-Characterized Prior Cases to Establish that
the Risk-of-Loss Principle Determines When Debt Is Created

The lead opinion used the risk-of-loss principle to guide the analysis
of what constitutes debt. According to this principle, courts determine
whether there is debt by focusing on who—the taxpayers or the
creditors—would lose money if the primary debtor is unable to pay127
without considering the likelihood of such an occurrence or the amount
at risk.128 Specifically, there is article VIII debt when taxpayers could be
required to make a payment on a debt obligation because the risk of loss
is deemed to fall on taxpayers rather than creditors.129 The plurality
justified applying this principle by concluding that the principle
underlies many of the various analyses the Court has used when
evaluating article VIII.130 In support of this conclusion, the lead opinion
noted that Robert Amdursky and Clayton Gillette131 previously had
122. Id. at 794, 287 P.3d at 570.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 792, 287 P.3d at 569.
125. See id. at 801, 287 P.3d at 574.
126. See id. at 803, 287 P.3d at 575.
127. See id. at 797, 287 P.3d at 572.
128. Id. at 798, 287 P.3d at 573.
129. See id. at 797, 287 P.3d at 572.
130. Id. The lead opinion, however, only addressed the principles explanatory power for three of
the  Court’s  doctrines:  guaranties,  special  funds,  and  lease-purchase agreements. Id. at 797–98, 287
P.3d at 572–73.
131. This  Essay  will  refer  to  “Amdursky  and  Gillette”  as  “Gillette”  when  discussing  their  work  
because Gillette was the author responsible for the portions of their book that are referenced in this
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characterized Washington cases in this manner in their book on
municipal debt.132
The plurality rationalized its use of the risk-of-loss principle by recharacterizing earlier cases and concluding that the principle explained
the   cases’   results.133 Because the Court had not explicitly or formally
adopted this analysis in earlier cases,134 the  plurality  was  “forced to craft
this test through inference.”135 The lead opinion developed this rule by
focusing on the facts and conclusions of each case but without
discussing the analysis in them.136 For example, the opinion highlighted
how the facts and opposite conclusions in State ex rel. Winston v. City of
Spokane137 and Martin—relatively similar cases involving construction
bonds that reached different results on whether the obligations
constituted debt—illustrate the point that the risk-of-loss principle
explains earlier cases.138 The plurality also contended the Court had
begun explicitly relying on this principle.139 The opinion focused on
Department of Ecology’s  plurality  opinion,  which  held  there  was  no  debt  
Essay. E-mail from Clayton P. Gillette, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, to
Hugh Spitzer, Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law (May 19, 2013, 14:31
EST) (on file with author). Clayton Gillette is a Professor of Law at New York University School of
Law who focuses on, among other things, local-government law. Clayton Gillette, N.Y.U.,
https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=19945.
132. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572 (discussing AMDURSKY &
GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.2, at 164–70).  Gillette’s  work is discussed further in Part II.C.1.c.
133. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73.
134. See id. at 819, 287 P.3d at 582 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting); AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra
note 38, § 4.1.2, at 169  (stating  that  “the  mechanisms  devised  to  avoid  debt  limits  have  not  readily  
been  analyzed  by  reference  to  the  standard  of  ultimate  exposure  of  the  public  treasury”).
135. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 819, 287 P.3d at 582 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
Even the plurality appears to concede the principle has not been definitively established as the law.
See id. at 798 n.9, 287 P.3d at 572 n.9 (plurality opinion) (asserting it is important to state the
principle directly because there is a pattern of courts relying on the principle).
136. See id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73.
137. 12 Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895).
138. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572. The lead opinion
asserted there was article VIII debt in Martin because if the state was unable to repay the bonds then
the state would raise the excise tax, therefore, putting the risk of a shortfall on the taxpayers. Id. at
797, 287 P.3d at 572. In contrast, Wenatchee Events Center highlighted that the bonds in City of
Spokane were  not  debt  because  the  bonds  were  payable  only  from  the  project’s  revenue—thus, the
taxpayers bore no risk. Id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572. But this reframing of cases is problematic;
Martin, in particular, did not address who bore the risk of loss and instead relied on reaffirming the
earlier principle that debt is an obligation payable from taxes. See generally State ex rel. Wash.
State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963).
139. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572. The lead opinion omitted
that Department of Ecology was a plurality—a majority agreed in the result but only three justices
signed the opinion that Wenatchee Events Center quotes for the risk-of-loss principle. See generally
Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246,  804  P.2d  1241  (1991)  (plurality  opinion).
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because “[t]he ultimate  risk  of  loss  is  not  on  the  State’s  future  taxpayers.  
Instead, the risk of loss is on the [investors], who will have entered into
the transaction with full knowledge that they alone bear that risk.”140
Having re-characterized  the  Court’s  previous  cases  to  establish the riskof-loss principle, the plurality in Wenatchee Events Center turned to the
contingency and guaranty cases.
b.

The Lead Opinion Applied the Risk-of-Loss Principle to Resolve
the Conflict Between the Guaranty and Contingent Liability Cases

Wenatchee Events Center’s   lead   opinion   addressed   the   conflict  
between the contingent-liability cases and the guaranty case—ultimately
concluding that State Capitol Commission’s   treatment   of   guaranties   as  
debt is the correct statement of law.141 The plurality discussed three
types of contingent liabilities: (1) pay-as-you-go agreement—the
obligation to pay depends on receiving goods; (2) limited-contingent
liability—the potential obligation is less than the entire debt; and
(3) unlimited-contingent liability—the potential obligation is equal to the
entire debt.142 The lead opinion concluded that a pay-as-you-go
arrangement is not debt and then turned to the remaining types of
contingent liabilities.143
The lead opinion drew a distinction between limited- and unlimitedcontingent liabilities by suggesting that Comfort correctly stated the law
but  that  the  case’s  dicta  was  too  broad.144 Specifically, the opinion stated
that Comfort may have correctly held that limited-contingent obligations
are not debt but reached too far by stating that unlimited-contingent
obligations—which Wenatchee Events Center’s  plurality  deems  absolute  
guaranties—are not debt.145 This latter conclusion in Comfort the
plurality deemed dicta and directly contradicted by State Capitol
Commission’s  treatment of guaranties.146
140. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572–73 (alteration in original)
(quoting Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 254–55, 804 P.2d at 1245).
141. See id. at 799, 801–02, 287 P.3d at 573–74.
142. See id. at 799–801, 287 P.3d at 573–74.
143. Id. at 799–800, 287 P.3d at 573.
144. See id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574.
145. See id. at 802, 287 P.3d at 574.
146. Id. at 800–01, 287 P.3d at 573–74. It is debatable whether this portion of Comfort is dicta
because  the  language  appears  directly  related  and  necessary  to  resolving  the  case’s  central  issue.  Id.
at  816,  287  P.3d  at  581  (Fairhurst,  J.  dissenting).  Furthermore,  the  plurality’s  assertion that Comfort
discussed two types of contingent liabilities—one in holding and one in dicta—is questionable
because Comfort focused on whether the obligation was currently owed or whether it was
conditioned on some future event—there was no indication that the limited size of the obligation
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The plurality resolved this conflict by applying the risk-of-loss
principle.147 The lead opinion explained that State Capitol Commission
was correct and Comfort’s   dicta   was   incorrect   because   the   risk   of   loss  
for a contingent liability falls on the municipality: “Even   if   the  
municipality’s  liability  is  contingent  upon  the  failure  of  payment  by  an  
intervening agency such as the District, such a contingent liability is
subject to the debt limit if the ultimate risk of loss falls upon the
municipality.”148 Although the lead opinion asserted its holding was
limited to Comfort’s   purported   dicta,   the   analysis   speaks   broadly   of  
contingent   liabilities   and   the   holding’s   justification—whether the
taxpayer bears risk—is equally applicable to both limited- and
unlimited-contingent liabilities.149 Thus, the lead opinion nominally
treats only unlimited-contingent liabilities as debt but appears in practice
to be overruling all of Comfort’s   contingent-liability doctrine and
treating all contingent obligations as debt.
c.

The Lead Opinion Held that the Entire Value of the CLA Was
Debt  Because  the  Agreement  was  a  Guaranty  of  the  District’s  
Bonds

Despite focusing on contingent liabilities for much of the opinion, the
lead opinion pivoted to conclude that the CLA was article VIII debt
because the CLA was a guaranty.150 The plurality explained the
substance of the agreement had the City acting as a traditional guarantor
by pledging to provide credit security to make the bonds more
marketable.151 Accordingly, the lead opinion treated the CLA as debt
because the CLA mirrored the situation in State Capitol Commission: a
public entity obligating itself to pay if the primarily liable party was
unable to make payments.152
In  sum,  Washington’s  constitutional-debt limits were at the center of
was a factor. See Comfort v. City of Tacoma, 142 Wash. 249, 255–258, 252 P. 929, 931–32 (1927);
see also State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 659–60, 384 P.2d 833,
841 (1963) (explaining that the reason for Comfort’s  holding  was  that  the  obligations  were  not  the  
city’s  debt).
147. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574. Reading the lead opinion as applying to all of Comfort is
further   justified   based   on   the   lead   opinion’s   unpersuasive   dissection   of Comfort into holding
(limited-contingent liabilities) and dicta (unlimited-contingent liabilities). See supra note 146.
150. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 803, 287 P.3d at 575.
151. Id. at 803, 287 P.3d at 575.
152. See id.
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Wenatchee Events Center. The Court was asked to reconcile existing
case law on guaranties and contingent liabilities. The lead opinion
resolved this conflict by developing an overarching framework for debt
cases—the risk-of-loss principle—and applying that standard to reject
only part of the contingent-liability   doctrine.   But   the   opinion’s   precise  
holding is unclear because the analysis seems to strike down the entire
contingent-liability doctrine while also discarding any conclusions about
the doctrine in favor of treating the agreement as a guaranty. Thus,
Wenatchee Events Center leaves significant questions about the fate and
scope of the contingent-liability doctrine.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT WENATCHEE EVENTS
CENTER

This Essay argues the Court should act promptly to address the
unsettled state of the law following Wenatchee Events Center because
the lead opinion fails to offer clear guidance, has a broader than intended
scope, and presents an incorrect framework—the risk-of-loss principle—
for evaluating debt. Because Washington law does not support this
principle, this Essay proposes the Court not follow Wenatchee Events
Center’s   approach   that   treats   all   contingent   liabilities   as   debt and
suggests treating as debt only those portions of contingent liabilities that
appear likely to require payment.
A.

Wenatchee Events Center Does Not Offer Clear Guidance to
Municipalities or Future Courts

The   lead   opinion’s   failure   to   garner   a   majority   and its unclear
treatment of contingent liabilities will make it difficult for municipalities
to assess their debt and for future courts to evaluate debt cases. As an
initial matter, the absence of a majority opinion minimizes the lead
opinion’s   usefulness.   Because Wenatchee Events Center is a plurality,
the opinion “has   limited   precedential   value   and   is   not   binding   on   the  
courts”;;153 thus, it is unclear whether the risk-of-loss principle will be
applied in future cases and how courts will view the lead opinion’s  
treatment of contingent liabilities.
Moreover,   the   lead   opinion’s   inconsistent   treatment   of   contingent  
liabilities also leaves courts and municipalities without clear guidance.
While Wenatchee Events Center appeared to reject the contingentliability doctrine, the lead opinion obfuscated this message in two ways.
153. In re Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390, 394 (2004).
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First, the opinion suggested Comfort was correctly decided154 even
though the risk-of-loss principle would seem to require overruling the
case.155 Specifically, the lead opinion indicated that Comfort correctly
held that limited-contingent obligations are not debt but did not reconcile
that conclusion with the fact that a municipality entering such an
agreement still bears some risk.156 Second, the opinion resolved the case
by holding the CLA was debt because it was a guaranty rather than a
contingent liability.157
In sum, there is no binding precedent and the existing precedent is far
from clear on how article VIII should be (or will be) treated in the
future.
B.

The Lead Opinion Unpersuasively Attempted to Limit Wenatchee
Events Center’s  Scope  by  Distinguishing  Between  Debt  and  
Indebtedness

The   plurality’s   attempt   to   confine   the   effect   of   the   opinion   to   only  
municipal government debt by distinguishing between debt and
indebtedness is unpersuasive.158 The basis for this position is not only at
odds   with   the   Court’s   precedent   but   also   lacks   support   in   both   the  
Constitution’s   text   and   principles   of   constitutional   interpretation.   As   a  
result, Wenatchee Events Center’s   lead   opinion   has   a   more   expansive  
scope than intended; the opinion puts both municipal and state financing
schemes at risk—or at least significantly affects the market and costs for
their bonds while uncertainty lingers about the plurality opinion.159
The lead opinion justified its holding in part by explaining that
section   6’s   language   limiting   the   ability   of   a   municipality   to   become  
indebted   in   any   manner   is   broader   than   section   1’s   limitation   on   state  
debt.160 But no authority was cited for this proposition nor was the
conclusion justified with analysis.161 Basing such an important
distinction on an unsupported assertion means that future courts and
154. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 802, 287 P.3d at 574.
155. See id. at 801, 287 P.3d at 574 (explaining that a contingent liability is debt whenever
taxpayers could ultimately be required to make a payment).
156. See id. at 801–02, 287 P.3d at 574. The lead opinion does not explain why or how Comfort’s  
limited-contingent liability renders that agreement not debt or how courts in the future should
determine what percentage is acceptable in a CLA before it becomes debt.
157. Id. at 803, 287 P.3d at 575.
158. See id. at 807, 287 P.3d at 577 (stating that section 6 is broader than section 1).
159. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 7.
160. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 807, 287 P.3d at 577.
161. See id.
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policy makers will have to hypothesize as to the reasoning. Accordingly,
this Essay presents, discusses, and ultimately rejects two potential
justifications—based on the text of each provision—that might support
the distinction. The Essay then turns to traditional principles of
constitutional interpretation to bolster the conclusion that there is no
difference  between  “debt”  and  “indebtedness”—which is the position the
Court embraced prior to Wenatchee Events Center.162 Accordingly, the
holding in Wenatchee Events Center is applicable to both state and
municipal  financing  despite  the  lead  opinion’s  attempt  at  minimizing  the  
opinion’s  scope.
1.

“Debt”  is  Not  a  Term  of  Art  that  Is Narrower than
“Indebtedness”

The   plurality   could   be   asserting   that   “debt”   is   a   term   of   art   while  
“indebted  in  any  manner”  is  not.163 This has some facial appeal because
article VIII, section 1(d) has a relatively detailed definition  of  “debt.”164
If   “debt”   is   a   term   of   art,   then   the   corresponding   failure   to   define  
“indebtedness”  could  indicate  that  the  provisions  are  addressing  different  
types of obligations.165 To   understand   the   meaning   of   section   1’s  
definition   of   “debt,”   it   is helpful to look at the origins of the
definition.166 The drafters of the 1972 amendment defining debt merely
enshrined the definition established in previous cases.167 These cases and
the  Court’s  other  opinions  addressing  debt  limitations  did  not  distinguish
between debt and indebtedness; the Court often mixed and matched
cases dealing with either section while applying the same analytical
frameworks.168 Up until Wenatchee Events Center, no distinction was
162. Supra Part I.B.1.
163. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 807, 287 P.3d at 577 (distinguishing section
1 from section 6 on the basis that the language in section 6 is broader).
164. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
165. Cf. State v. Kintz, 169 Wash. 2d 537, 549–50, 238 P.3d 470, 477 (2010) (explaining the
importance attached to omissions when doing statutory interpretation).
166. See Wash.  Water  Jet  Workers  Ass’n  v.  Yarbrough,  151  Wash.  2d  470,  477,  90  P.3d  42,  46  
(2004) (noting that the Court may examine the historical context of a constitutional provision for
guidance).
167. Compare WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)  (defining  debt  as  “borrowed  money”  that  must  be  
“repaid . . . from  general  state  revenues”),  with State ex rel. Wittler v. Yelle, 65 Wash. 2d 660, 668,
399   P.2d   319,   324   (1965)   (noting   that   the   Court   has   repeatedly   said   debt   means   “borrowed  
money”),  State  ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 661, 384 P.2d 833, 843
(1963)  (noting  “[a]ny  obligation which must in law be paid from any taxes levied generally is . . . a
debt  of  the  state”),  and State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 36 Wash. 2d 192, 194, 217 P.2d 337, 338 (1950)
(defining debt as borrowed money).
168. Supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
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drawn   between   the   meaning   of   “debt”   and   “indebtedness.”169
Accordingly,  the  argument  that  “debt”  in  section  1  is  a  term  of  art  does  
not  justify  a  broader  treatment  of  “indebtedness”  in  section  6.
2.

Section 6 Is Not More Inclusive than Section 1

Alternatively,  the  plurality  could  be  arguing  that  section  6’s  inclusion
of  “in  any  manner”  means  the  section  is  broader  than  section  1  (which  
just   refers   to   “debt”).   This   is   problematic   because   section   6   alternates  
between   “indebtedness”   and   “indebted   in   any   manner”   when   defining  
the applicable limitations.170 Therefore,   reaching   the   plurality’s  
conclusion  that  section  6  is  broader  than  section  1(d)  on  the  basis  of  “in  
any   manner”   would   also   require   recognizing   two   types   of   debt   within  
section 6—one   for   “indebtedness”   and   one   for   “indebted   in   any  
manner.”   Such   an   interpretation cannot be supported because (1) this
distinction has not been recognized in previous cases, (2) Wenatchee
Events Center made no reference to such a fundamental shift,171 and
(3) this interpretation is not supported by the discussions at the
Constitutional Convention that evince the purpose behind article VIII.172
3.

Principles of Constitutional Construction Support an Identical
Interpretation  of  “Debt”  and  “Indebtedness”

Having presented and rejected two possible justifications for the lead
opinion’s   unsupported distinction between debt and indebtedness, the
plurality’s   conclusion   is   also   not   supported   by   Washington   State  
principles of constitutional construction. Under these principles, the
Court looks to the common, ordinary meaning of the words173 but may
also consider historical context.174 If the words are unambiguous and the
ordinary meaning leads to a reasonable conclusion, the terms are read
169. See supra Part I.B.2.
170. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII,   §   6   (prohibiting   a   municipality   from   being   “indebted   in   any  
manner”  beyond  one  and  a  half  percent  without  assent  but  then  limiting  “indebtedness”  with  voter  
assent to five percent).
171. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 807, 287 P.3d 567, 577 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
172. See JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 675–79  (presenting  a  record  of  the  delegates’  debates  about  
the debt limits without any indication that the delegates considered, let alone implemented, different
methods of calculating municipal limits depending on whether the debt was incurred with or
without voter assent).
173. State ex rel. Albright v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 393 P.2d 231, 233 (1964).
174. Wash.   Water   Jet   Workers   Ass’n   v.   Yarbrough,   151   Wash.   2d   470,   477,   90   P.3d   42,   46  
(2004).
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according to this meaning rather than resorting to a forced construction
to limit or extend the function.175
Turning  first  to  the  ordinary  meanings  of  “debt”  and  “indebtedness,”  
there   is   no   basis   for   distinguishing   between   the   terms.   Black’s   Law  
Dictionary   treats   them   as   synonyms   by   defining   “indebtedness”   as  
“[s]omething  owed;;  a   debt.”176 Bryan Garner further explained that the
terms are functional equivalents: “[Indebtedness] is frequently used
where the simpler word debt would be preferable”  and  “indebtedness is
a NEEDLESS VARIANT of debt.”177 Interpreting  “debt”  and  “indebtedness”  
as distinct terms would require a forced construction to create a
difference where none exists.
Second, the historical context offers no support for distinct
interpretations  of  “debt”  and  “indebtedness.”  The  reasons  for  restricting  
state and municipal debt were identical.178 There is no indication in the
convention record that the delegates intended section 1 and section 6 to
restrict different types of obligations.179
In sum, Wenatchee Events Center could have a broader than intended
effect  because  the  lead  opinion’s  treatment of  “debt”  and  “indebtedness”  
as distinct concepts is an unsupported conclusion that fails to narrow the
holding. Thus, the lead opinion could have a significant effect on both
municipalities and the state by altering their current debt levels,
changing available financing mechanisms, and increasing costs.180
Accordingly, the Court should revisit and clarify Wenatchee Events
Center’s  discussion  of  debt.

175. O’Connell  v.  Slavin,  75  Wash.  2d  554,  558,  452  P.2d  943,  946  (1969).
176. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 836 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). This definition is
synonymous   with   the   definition   of   debt:   “liability   on   a   claim;;   a   specific   sum   of   money   due   by  
agreement  or  otherwise.”  Id. at 462. Even the lead opinion used the terms interchangeably earlier in
the opinion. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 791–92,   287   P.3d   at   569   (“Total  
municipal debt incurred   without   a   public   vote   is   limited”   and   “[o]ur   state   constitution   limits  
municipal indebtedness”  (emphasis  added)).
177. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 436 (3d ed. 2009)
(emphasis in original). Washington  courts  have  looked  to  Garner’s   work  to  help  clarify  definition  
and grammar issues in the past. E.g.,  Flight  Options,  LLC  v.  State  Dep’t  of  Revenue,  172  Wash.  2d.  
487, 502, 259 P.3d 234, 242 (2011) (citing BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL
USAGE 811  (2d  ed.  1995),  for  the  proposition  that  “situate”  and  “situated”  are  synonyms);;  Black  v.  
Nat’l   Merit   Ins.   Co.,   154   Wash.   App.   674,   688,   226   P.3d   175,   182   (2010)   (citing   BRYAN A.
GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 453–54 (1st ed. 1998), for the proposition
that  “or”  is  not  always  used  to  indicate  an  alternative).  
178. See supra Part I.A.1.
179. See JOURNAL, supra note 29, at 667–84.
180. See supra notes 20–21.
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Wenatchee Events Center’s  Risk-of-Loss Principle Is Not the
Correct Framework for Examining Public Debt in Washington

The Court should not embrace the risk-of-loss principle in subsequent
opinions. First, the framework is not supported in Washington case law.
Second, the framework is not used by other jurisdictions, which is an
important consideration because the Court has recognized that article
VIII is situated firmly within a nationwide tradition and has drawn from
other jurisdictions to resolve public-debt questions.
1.

Washington Law Does Not Support the Risk-of-Loss Principle

The risk-of-loss principle is not supported  by  Washington’s  case  law  
on debt limits. This Essay highlights the lack of support by examining
three   problems   with   the   lead   opinion’s   attempt   to   justify   the   principle.  
First, the plurality re-characterized prior precedent without regard for the
analysis applied in those cases. Second, the plurality ignored
inconsistent cases. Third, the plurality relied on an academic piece that
recognized that the risk-of-loss principle is not a talisman for all of
Washington’s   debt   cases   and   supported   the   principle’s   limited  
explanatory powers with problematic analysis.
a.

The  Lead  Opinion’s  Re-Characterization of Prior Cases Does Not
Support the Conclusion that Risk of Loss Applies to Article VIII

The   lead   opinion’s   establishment   of   the   risk-of-loss principle by recharacterizing prior cases is problematic because the opinion conflates
correlation   with   causation,   ignores   the   Court’s   various   approaches   to  
debt  limits,  and  fails  to  address  the  principle’s  absence  in  prior  case  law.
Wenatchee Events Center conflates correlation with causation by
ignoring the underlying analysis in the cases that are re-characterized to
establish the risk-of-loss principle.181 The plurality establishes the
principle by going through prior decisions and concluding that they are
consistent with the risk-of-loss principle.182 But the opinion never
discusses whether the decisions were actually decided on that principle
nor does the plurality address the underlying analysis used in those
cases.183 The plurality merely shows a correlation—the result in some of
the   Court’s   earlier   decisions   may   be   consistent   with   the   risk-of-loss
181. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572. For a discussion of
how the lead opinion re-characterized prior cases see supra Part I.C.2.a.
182. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572.
183. Id. at 797–98, 287 P.3d at 572–73.
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principle—but never demonstrates that the Court used that principle to
reach the result, let alone consistently approached cases using that
framework.184 The plurality does not show causation because they
cannot show causation: The Court has not previously analyzed debt
cases using the risk-of-loss principle.185 Accordingly, the plurality does
not demonstrate that the risk-of-loss principle is the basis for the results
in previous cases, which undermines their reason for using the principle
to address the Comfort-State Capitol Commission split and ultimately
the CLA in Wenatchee Events Center.
Moreover, the re-characterization of prior cases to establish a single
principle is problematic   because   that   approach   disregards   the   Court’s  
history of employing various frameworks to guide the debt analysis.
Like other jurisdictions, the Court resisted developing a general standard
for determining whether obligations implicate the debt limits and instead
relied on a diverse range of exceptions and principles.186 The lack of a
unifying framework becomes more evident by looking at some of the
Court’s   debt   cases   where   the   Court   fluctuated   between   relying  
extensively on the analysis conducted in other states187 and at other times
looking only to local opinions.188 The variety of approaches the Court
has   embraced   undermine   the   lead   opinion’s   attempt   to   re-characterize
prior opinions in order to recognize one guiding principle.
Finally, the re-characterization of Washington case law does not
support the risk-of-loss   principle   because   the   lead   opinion’s   analysis  
glosses over the fact that the Court had never expressly embraced the
principle in the debt-limit context.189 Despite over a century of case law
184. See id.
185. Supra note 134.
186. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. For a sampling of the different
approaches, see Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm., 116 Wash. 2d 246, 254–55, 804 P.2d 1241,
1245 (1991) (plurality opinion) (lease-purchase agreements), State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 36 Wash. 2d
192, 195, 217 P.2d 337, 337 (1950) (warrant obligations for current year expenses), and Winston v.
City of Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 526–27, 41 P. 888, 888 (1895) (special-fund doctrine).
187. See, e.g., Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 256–57, 256 n.9, 804 P.2d at 1246, 1246 n.9
(determining   that   Oregon’s   case   law   was   persuasive   and   citing   other   states’   opinions);;   Troy, 36
Wash. 2d at 204–07, 217 P.2d at 343–45  (looking  to  Oklahoma’s  constitution  and  case  law).
188. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 652–61, 384
P.2d 833, 838–42 (1963) (clarifying the special-fund doctrine).
189. Before Wenatchee Events Center,   the   Court’s   article   VIII   cases   applied   the   risk-of-loss
framework   in   a   majority   opinion   only   when   evaluating   section   5’s   prohibition   on the lending of
state credit to private parties. See Wash.  State  Hous.  Fin.  Comm’n  v.  O’Brien,  100  Wash.  2d  491,  
494–95, 671 P.2d 247, 249–50 (1983). However, the Court abandoned this framework following
Professor Hugh   Spitzer’s An Analytical View of Recent “Lending of Credit” Decisions in
Washington State, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 195 (1985). Wash. Higher Educ. Facilities Auth. v.
Gardner, 103 Wash. 2d 838, 846–47, 699 P.2d 1240, 1244–45 (1985) (declining to use the risk-of-

Hansen_Revisiting Contingent Liabilities_Copy Edit Changes Made.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

REVISITING CONTINGENT LIABILITIES

10/6/2015 4:46 PM

131

interpreting   section   1   and   section   6,   the   term   “risk   of   loss”   has   never  
appeared in a majority opinion addressing these issues. Before
Wenatchee Events Center, the term was only used in the debt-limit
context in Department of Ecology’s   plurality   opinion.190 If the risk-ofloss   principle   guided   each   of   the   Court’s   debt   opinions,   one   would  
expect the term to have appeared: (1) before 1991, (2) within more than
one opinion, or at least (3) inside a majority opinion. These absences
reinforce the notion that the Court has not consistently relied on the riskof-loss principle when determining how to evaluate article VIII.
Nonetheless, the plurality seizes on the language in Department of
Ecology as evidence that that Court relied on the principle before
Wenatchee Events Center.   The   lead   opinion   explained   that   in   “recent  
cases”  the  Court  has  “begun  explicitly  relying  on  the  risk  of  loss  concept  
as  a  basis  for  our  decisions”  and  presents   Department of Ecology as an
example of this trend.191 The plurality is wrong for three reasons. First,
there is no trend. Department of Ecology is not an example of recent
cases relying explicitly on the risk-of-loss principle in the debt context—
it is the only case. Second, the Court did not embrace the principle in
Department of Ecology despite the opportunity to do so. A majority of
the Court declined to sign onto the opinion using the risk-of-loss
language.192 Third, the scope of Department of Ecology is a matter of
enough debate that the State Finance Committee has recommended a
very narrow  reading  that  limits  reliance  on  the  case’s  holding  to  closely  
related facts.193 The State Finance Committee, after reviewing the
“vigorous  dissent”  and  the  concurrence’s  emphasis  that  long-term leases
should not be used as subterfuge, recommended that financing contracts
only be used in fact patterns very similar to Department of Ecology in
order to avoid having the agreements treated as debt.194 This guidance
reflects a concern that Department of Ecology is not the fundamental
shift for which the plurality cites the case.
loss approach and quoting Professor   Spitzer’s   Article). Moreover, lending credit and defining
“debt”  are  distinct  concepts,  which  the  plurality  acknowledged  by  not  citing  O’Brien. See generally
Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567.
190. See   Dep’t   of   Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 254–55, 804 P.2d at 1245 (using the principle
without citation to any other cases).
191. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572.
192. See  Dep’t  of  Ecology, 116 Wash. 2d at 259, 804 P.2d at 1247 (noting that only three justices
signed the lead opinion); In re Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390, 394 (2004) (explaining
that a plurality is not binding on future courts).
193. See generally WASH. STATE FIN. COMM., GUIDELINES FOR USE OF FINANCING CONTRACTS
(2011), available at http://www.tre.wa.gov/documents/sfc_GuidlinesUseFinancingContracts.pdf.
194. See id. at 1–2.
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The Risk-of-Loss Principle Does Not Explain Washington Cases
on Debt

The analysis used to justify the risk-of-loss principle does not (and
cannot) explain the diverse range of precedent on what is article VIII
debt.195 Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court accepted the
contingent-liability doctrine—a framework that is incompatible with the
risk-of-loss principle.196 The lead opinion carefully avoids this issue by
asserting the risk-of-loss principle through a limited survey of
Washington cases; the plurality looks at cases that support their position
and ignores cases like Kelly and Comfort that do not fit the
framework.197 The plurality addresses these unsupportive cases only
after establishing the framework they contend explains Washington law:
the risk-of-loss principle.198 It   is   easier   to   “find”   principles   when   the  
search looks for authority that supports the idea and sets aside
contradictory materials.
c.

The Lone Academic Piece Embracing the Risk-of-Loss Principle
for Washington Cases Offers a Tentative and Incomplete Analysis

Academics have not embraced the idea that the risk-of-loss principle
explains  Washington’s  public  debt  cases.  The  idea  has  been  presented  in  
only   one   place:   Gillette’s   Municipal   Debt   Finance   Law:   Theory   and  
Practice.199 Despite   academia   not   embracing   Gillette’s   conclusion,   the  
plurality   relies   in   part   on   Gillette’s   analysis   as   part   of   the   basis   for  
establishing the risk-of-loss principle.200 This reliance is problematic for
two reasons: (1) Gillette is unwilling to assert that risk of loss fully
explains  Washington  debt  cases,  and  (2)  Gillette’s  analysis  is  incomplete  

195. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. Even the plurality agrees that
the risk-of-loss framework only explains some of the cases. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175
Wash.   2d   at   798,   287   P.3d   at   572   (“Nearly every case . . . is   consistent   with   this   ‘risk   of   loss’  
principle”  (emphasis  added)).  
196. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574.
197. See id. at 797–99, 287 P.3d at 572–73 (establishing the risk-of-loss principle by looking to
City of Spokane, Martin, and Department of Ecology without discussing Comfort and Kelly).
198. See id. at 799, 800–02, 287 P.3d at 573–74 (establishing principle and discussing Comfort).
199. This book is the only academic source cited by either the lead opinion or  the  plaintiff’s  brief.  
See generally id., 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567; Brief of Respondent City of Wenatchee,
Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287 P.3d 567 (2012) (No. 86552-3). A search of
common legal resources reveals no other sources asserting this proposition. Moreover, one can
fairly  assume  that  if  other  sources  supported  the  plurality’s  fundamental  shift  then  they  would  have  
bolstered their position by position by citing additional sources.
200. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572.
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and misleading.
i.

Gillette Does Not View the Risk-of-Loss Principle as a Talisman
for  All  of  Washington’s  Debt  Cases

Gillette is only willing to support the idea that the risk-of-loss
principle is, at best, a partial answer for when debt has been recognized
in Washington. He acknowledges that his argument has limited
explanatory powers: The   “[a]pplication   of   [the   risk-of-loss principle]
brings a high, though by no means complete, degree of consistency to an
otherwise  irreconcilable  body  of  cases”201 and  the  principle  “does  bring  
some order  to  the  [Court’s]  decisions.”202 Contrary  to  the  lead  opinion’s  
assertion, Gillette is not concluding that the risk-of-loss principle
determines   when   an   obligation   triggers   Washington’s   debt   limits.203
Rather, his conclusion is more nuanced; he believes the risk-of-loss
principle can, at best, explain why the debt limit is triggered in some of
the  Court’s  public  debt  cases.204
ii.

Errors  in  Gillette’s  Analysis  Undermine  His  Conclusion  that the
Risk-of-Loss Principle Is Applicable

Gillette’s   limited   explanation   of   Washington’s   public   debt   cases   is
also problematic because it is based on incomplete and misleading
analysis. First, he glosses over or ignores critical cases that are not
explained by the proposed framework.205 He relegates Comfort to a
footnote   with   a   “but   see”   citation   and   no   analysis—he does not try to
explain how this case can be explained by the risk-of-loss principle and
does not even address Kelly.206 Gillette does not offer an explanation
because he cannot: The cases are not reconcilable with the risk-of-loss
principle.207 Accordingly, his conclusion is clouded by selection bias—
201. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162.
202. Id. § 4.1.2, at 169 (emphasis added).
203. Compare id. (recognizing that the risk-of-loss   principle   does   not   fully   explain   the   Court’s  
opinions on debt), with Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 798, 287 P.3d at 572
(summarizing  Gillette’s  position  as  “concluding  that  [Washington’s]  debt  limits  are  triggered  where  
the risk of project  failure  falls  on  the  taxpayers”).  
204. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162. But even this conclusion is
problematic because Gillette makes the same mistake as the plurality: conflating correlation with
causation. He surveys Washington cases saying how the risk-of-loss principle could explain the
results in those cases but never explains how the analysis in those cases supports the principle.
205. See id. § 4.1.2, at 164–70.
206. Id. § 4.1.2, at 167 n.17.
207. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574.
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effectively ignoring cases that challenge his analysis—that allows him to
draw  inappropriate  conclusions  about  Washington’s  debt  law.
Second, Gillette misrepresents Department of Ecology to manufacture
stronger support for the risk-of-loss principle. He incorrectly asserts that
the Court expressly relied on the principle.208 However, Gillette does not
disclose that Department of Ecology’s   risk-of-loss discussion had
limited-precedential value because it occurred in a plurality opinion.209
He   ventures   beyond   mere   omission   because   he   inaccurately   states   “the
majority opinion explicitly   based   its   decision   on   the   issue   of   risk.”210
Without  this  statement,  Gillette’s  conclusion  about  Washington’s  use  of  
the risk-of-loss principle would have relied only on inferences—a
weaker analytical tool—because the Court never explicitly addressed the
principle before Department of Ecology.   Thus,   Gillette’s  
misrepresentation  of  the  case’s  nature  artificially  inflates  the  support  for  
his theory on the risk-of-loss principle. This misdirection underscores
the weakness of his analysis for explaining a broad range of cases that
Gillette   earlier   generally   referred   to   as   “irreconcilable”   and   decidedly  
“ad-hoc.”211
2.

The Court Should Reject the Risk-of-Loss Principle Because It
Disregards the Common Origins of Article VIII

The   lead   opinion’s   adoption   of   the   risk-of-loss principle is
problematic  because  the  Court  has  indicated  other  jurisdictions’  analyses  
of debt provisions are persuasive and no other state has embraced the
principle. Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court recognized the
state’s   debt   limits   originated   as   part   of   a   national   trend   by   turning   to  
other  jurisdictions’  case  law  to  help  interpret  article  VIII  and  embracing  
principles used by other states. The absence of the risk-of-loss principle
in these other jurisdictions suggests that the principle is not applicable to
Washington’s  debt  limits.

208. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.2, at 168.
209. See id. § 4.1.2, at 168; In re Isadore, 151 Wash. 2d 294, 302, 88 P.3d 390, 394 (2004)
(stating plurality opinions are not binding).
210. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.2, at 168 (emphasis added). Moreover,
Gillette’s   book   was   published   in   1992,   which   was   before   the   State   Finance   Committee   cast  
significant doubt on Department of Ecology’s  scope  of  the  opinion.   See supra text accompanying
note 194.
211. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1.1, at 162.
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Washington and Other States Have Recognized the Common
Origins of Their Debt Limits by Interpreting Them Similarly

Given the common motivation for restricting government debt and the
similar structure of the debt-limit provisions,212 it is unsurprising that
courts in different jurisdictions have analyzed their debt limits by
developing and applying relatively consistent principles. A fifty-state
survey of municipal-debt-provision schemes shows the same principles
have been applied by most of the states.213 For example, most states have
created a lease-purchase exception, developed a special-fund doctrine,
and recognized that contingent-liabilities are not debt.214
Before Wenatchee Events Center, the Court joined these other states
in implicitly recognizing a harmony between constitutional-debt limits
throughout the United States. Specifically, the Court signaled there was
a   harmony   between   Washington’s   provisions   and   those   in   other   states  
by: (1) looking to other jurisdictions for guidance or support;215 and
(2) using the same principles that were adopted in other states.216 This
practice of interpreting article VIII by looking to other jurisdictions and
applying similar principles indicates that the debt-limit provisions have
not, and should not, be read without consideration of the practices in
other states.
b.

The Lack of Risk-of-Loss Cases in Other States Supports the
Conclusion that the Framework is Not Applicable to Article VIII
Because the Court has indicated that the practices in other states are

212. Supra Part I.A.1–.2.
213. See generally MISS BETTIE MANN & DR. FREDERICK L. BIRD, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL BORROWING AND PROPERTY TAXING POWERS (1964) (surveying each
state and noting if they had recognized specific principles).
214. See generally id. While there is some variance, courts generally agree on the basic principles
and doctrines that apply—even if they are applied slightly differently depending on the jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Bisk, supra note 22, at 523–25 (explaining that there are a variety of approaches for leasepurchase agreements).
215. See, e.g., Dep’t  of  Ecology  v.  State  Fin.  Comm.,  116  Wash.  2d  246, 256–57 & n.9, 804 P.2d
1241, 1246 & n.9 (1991) (plurality opinion) (citing and discussing cases from Colorado, Florida,
Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, New Mexico, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
216. Compare id. at 255, 804 P.2d at 1245 (lease-purchase agreements), and Winston v. City of
Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 526–27, 41 P. 888, 888 (1895) (special-fund doctrine), with Charles, W.
Goldner, Jr., State and Local Government Fiscal Responsibility: An Integrated Approach, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 925, 935–36 (1991) (acknowledging that lease-purchase agreements, the specialfund doctrine, and other approaches have been embraced by state courts). See also MANN & BIRD,
supra note 213 (detailing the debt principles adopted in every state).
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instructive, the absence of the risk-of-loss principle in these states
indicates  that  the  principle  is  not  applicable  to  Washington’s  debt  limits.  
A survey of other states indicates that no other state has adopted the riskof-loss principle to resolve constitutional-debt cases—Washington
would be the first.217 Rather than adopting the principle, many states
have adopted a mutually exclusive principle: the contingent-liability
doctrine.218 Thus, the practice in other states suggests that the risk-ofloss principle is not the correct framework for article VIII. To
nonetheless adopt the principle, the Court would have to deny the
common origins of article VIII and treat the provisions as novel. Such an
approach   is   not   supported   by   the   Court’s   precedent   or   the   history   of  
article VIII.
D.

The Court Should Consider Adopting the Governmental
Accounting  Standards  Board’s  Evaluation  of  Contingent  
Obligations to Evaluate Article VIII Debt

If the Court declines to abandon categorizing CLAs as debt, the Court
should consider evaluating these agreements by using the Governmental
Accounting Standards Board’s   (“GASB”)219 Generally Accepted
Accounting   Principles   (“GAAP”)220 for nonexchange financial
guaranties221 rather than the risk-of-loss principle. The GAAP provide
standardized accounting standards for state and local governments
217. A search of traditional legal sources turned up no results, Wenatchee Events Center’s  lead  
opinion cited no authority that had reached a similar conclusion, and Gillette provides a relatively
detailed analysis of the concept without citing or quoting from a case outside of Washington
explicitly applying the concept. See generally Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 287
P.3d 567 (2012) (plurality opinion); AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 4.1, at 160–70.
218. See Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d at 801, 287 P.3d at 574 (explaining that the
risk-of-loss principle and contingent-liability doctrine are incompatible); MCQUILLIN, supra note
82, § 41.22 (recognizing that many states have adopted the contingent-liability doctrine).
219. The  GASB  develops  the  United  States’  Generally  Accepted  Accounting  Principles  for  state  
and local governments. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT GASB 1
(n.d.), available at http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%
2FDocument_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176164672329 [hereinafter GASB FACTS].
220. While the GAAP is used outside the United States, this  Essay  will  use  “the  GAAP”  to  refer  
exclusively  to  the  GASB’s  version  that  only  addresses  practices  for  jurisdictions  within  the  United  
States. See GASB FACTS, supra note 219, at 1.
221. This type of agreement is identical to the contingent liabilities addressed throughout this
Essay:  A  party  agrees  to  pay  a  debtor’s  obligation  under  specific  conditions  without receiving value
or approximately equal value in exchange for entering the agreement. See GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR NONEXCHANGE
FINANCIAL GUARANTEES 2 (2013) [hereinafter GAAP GUARANTIES], available at
http://gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=1176162551665&acceptedDiscl
aimer=true.
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within the United States.222 Although governments are not required to
follow the GAAP, the principles are widely used in Washington223 and
nationwide.224 Since 1984, the GAAP have been established by the
GASB—a non-profit private organization that develops the standards
through an open process that invites public feedback and expert
participation.225 The GASB produces a product analogous to the
Financial   Accounting   Standards   Board’s   (FASB)   principles   governing  
the preparation of financial reports by nongovernmental entities;
however,  the  GASB’s principles—unlike  the  FASB’s—are not officially
recognized as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.226
The GAAP for nonexchange financial guaranties are set forth in
GASB Statement 70 (“Statement 70”).227 The principles established in
Statement 70 require a government abiding by the GAAP to recognize a
liability for the amount that is likely to become owed on a contingent
obligation. Specifically, each government must reassess its agreements
each   year   and   recognize   a   liability   when   “qualitative factors228 and
222. Mission, Vision, and Core Values, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1175804850352 (last visited Mar.
27, 2015); see also OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AND ACCOUNTING MANUAL
Ch.   80.20.10   (2014)   (“Adherence   to   the   GAAP   provides   a   reasonable   degree   of   comparability  
among the financial reports  of  state  and  local  governmental  units.”).
223. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88.037 (2014) (adopting the GAAP for the state government);
GAAP VERSUS CASH REPORTING, WASH. STATE AUDITOR’S OFFICE (n.d.), available at
http://www.sao.wa.gov/resources/Documents/GAAP_Reporting_proscons.pdf (noting that twenty
percent of local governments used the GAAP but that they are the largest and most complex
governments).
224. See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., RESEARCH BRIEF: STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT USE OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR GENERAL PURPOSE
EXTERNAL
FINANCING
REPORTING
1–2,
5
tbl.1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=GASB&c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocu
ment_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176156726669 (estimating that between 62.27% and
71.52% of state and local government entities follow the GAAP based on a sample that represents
98% of all government revenue).
225. GASB FACTS, supra note 219, at 1–2.
226. Compare id. (explaining  that  the  GASB’s   GAAP  are  not  federal  laws  or  regulations),   with
Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2015)  (explaining  the  FASB’s  standards  are  officially recognized by the SEC).
227. GAAP GUARANTIES, supra note 221 (Statement 70); see GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., THE HIERARCHY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1–4 (2009), available at http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/
Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=1176159972129&acceptedDisclaimer=true (establishing
GASB Statements as the most authoritative source of the GAAP).
228. Examples of qualitative factors include the debtor: (1) entering bankruptcy, (2) breaching the
contract creating the underlying debt (e.g. not meeting covenants or defaults in payments), or
(3) demonstrating signs of significant financial difficultly (e.g. drawing on reserve funds to make
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historical data, if any, . . . indicate that it is more likely than not that the
government  will  be  required  to  make  a  payment.”229 The liability would
equal   “the   discounted   present   value   of   the   best   estimate   of   the   future  
outflows expected to  be  incurred.”230
Statement 70 and its principles for nonexchange financial guaranties
could be used in the article VIII context by counting the assessed
liability as debt. There are three reasons why this approach would be
preferable to the risk-of-loss principle embraced by Wenatchee Events
Center’s   lead   opinion.   First,   in   contrast   to   the   lead   opinion’s   unclear  
treatment of contingent obligations,231 Statement 70 offers a clear
standard that will be easier for the Court and municipalities to apply.232
This is important for municipalities whose effectiveness depends, at least
in part, on being able to understand what constitutes debt so that they
can   determine   what   projects   can   be   pursued.   Second,   Statement   70’s  
standard protects municipal- and state-financial flexibility by facilitating
the use of a common-funding mechanism without triggering the sudden
and unexpected recognition of debt that is likely to occur under the riskof-loss framework.233 Preserving this flexibility comports with the
Court’s   precedent,234 is consistent with national trends,235 and is
important for the variety of projects that the state and municipalities
frequently undertake.236 Third,   Statement   70’s   reliance   on   experts  
(accountants) creates a more accurate, nuanced perspective of debt—
recognizing it is only money that is, or is likely to become, due—rather
than the more draconian all-or-nothing rule advanced by Wenatchee
Events Center.
debt payments, seeking debt-holder concessions, incurring significant investment loses). GAAP
GUARANTIES, supra note 221, at 3.
229. Id. “[M]ore  likely  than  not”  means  a  likelihood  of  more  than  fifty  percent.  Id. at 4 n.2.
230. Id. at 4.
231. See supra Part II.A (highlighting the seemingly contradictory nature of the opinion and the
lack of guidance for determining what percentage makes an obligation a guaranty rather than a
contingent liability).
232. In fact, the state is already applying this standard and many local governments are as well.
See supra note 223.
233. If the Court adopted the risk-of-loss principle in a majority opinion—removing any doubt
about its applicability—there would likely be a sudden increase in the amount of debt recognized by
municipalities. See supra note 2 (explaining the value of debt secured by existing CLAs). In fact,
even the uncertainty about the treatment of CLAs has caused some municipalities to recognize more
debt because of their existing CLAs. Supra note 21.
234. See supra note 216 (highlighting the various exceptions recognized in Washington).
235. Heil, supra note 28, at 86 (recognizing a national trend of courts approving methods for
evading rigid limits).
236. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Direct Review, supra note 2, at 11.
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Statement 70 not only has these three distinct advantages over
Wenatchee Events Center’s  risk-of-loss approach, but the statement also
addresses   the   plurality’s   concern   about   CLAs:   municipalities  
guarantying debt without regard for their limits and then being forced to
resort to taxes when the agreements suddenly came due.237 Under
Statement 70, municipalities are unlikely to lightly enter into CLAs
because the potential burden is not just an obligation to make a payment
in the distant future but is also a present-day concern: part of the value
can count against their debt limit each year. The likelihood that
municipalities will enter into CLAs without careful deliberation is
further  minimized  by  the  limited  volatility  introduced  by  Statement  70’s  
standard: Debt from CLAs will be added or subtracted annually based on
the likelihood that a payment will have to be made.238 By creating the
potential for a more immediate effect on the debt limit, Statement 70
should encourage officials to thoroughly scrutinize a potential CLA
rather than merely looking at the short-term  gains.  Thus,  Statement  70’s  
volatility responds to one of the concerns underlying debt restrictions:
limiting the perverse incentive politicians have to enter into guaranties
for short-term gain without regard for the potential long-term costs.239
CONCLUSION
Wenatchee Events Center’s  lead  opinion’s adoption of the risk-of-loss
principle and treatment of contingent liabilities as debt are problematic.
As soon as practicable and in an appropriate case, the Court should grant
a petition for review addressing these topics because Wenatchee Events
Center is unclear, has a broader than intended scope, and recognizes an
incorrect   framework   for   public   debt.   The   lead   opinion’s   inconsistent  
treatment of contingent liabilities and failure to garner a majority means
the opinion does not offer clear guidance to policy makers or courts.
Beyond a lack of clarity, the opinion has a broader than intended scope
because the attempt to compartmentalize the holding by limiting it to
municipal debt—based   on   a   distinction   between   “debt”   and  
“indebtedness”—is not persuasive. Finally, the adoption of the risk-ofloss principle—used to justify the treatment of contingent liabilities as
debt—is not supported by case law, academics, or the origins of
Washington’s  debt-limit provisions.
237. Wenatchee Events Center, 175 Wash. 2d 788, 801–02, 287 P.3d 567, 574 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
238. GAAP GUARANTIES, supra note 221, at 4.
239. See Bisk, supra note 22, at 525.
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After granting a petition for review, the Court should decline to adopt
the risk-of-loss principle and instead provide a clear, easily applicable
rule on contingent liabilities. This is important because the frequent use
of CLAs as a funding mechanism makes clarity and predictability
critical factors. In pursuit of this goal, the Court should look to the
GAAP on nonexchange financial guaranties. This standard would
require municipalities to annually evaluate their contingent liabilities and
recognize debt for any amounts that are likely to become due. This
approach is preferable because it balances clarity and flexibility with
appropriate safeguards against improvident decision-making.
In sum, the Court should address the problematic analysis adopted by
Wenatchee Events Center’s   lead   opinion   while   offering   a   clear   and  
binding rule about the status of contingent liabilities. One avenue to
explore would be using the GAAP for nonexchange financial guaranties.

